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PUTTING THE “REMEDY” BACK IN THE 
INTERNATIONAL CHILD ABDUCTION 
REMEDIES ACT—ENFORCING VISITATION 
RIGHTS FOR THE LEFT BEHIND PARENT 
NICOLE CLARK† 
INTRODUCTION 
A man and a woman from the United States met, got 
married, and started a family in England.  They lived happily for 
some time, but later decided to separate.  After a contentious 
divorce and a hard-fought custody battle, the mother received 
primary custody of their two young children, and the father 
received visitation every other weekend.  He loved his children 
and lived for their weekends together.  But one weekend, several 
years after the divorce, he was unable to get in contact with his 
wife.  He called and sent messages to no avail; he went to her 
house only to find that she had moved out a week and a half 
before.  Finally, after two weeks had passed, he received the call:  
She had taken the children to the United States, she wanted to 
move back home, and she did not want to see him—or to let the 
children see him—ever again. 
The father was devastated and turned to the Hague 
Convention on the Civil Aspects of Child Abduction (“Hague 
Convention”), which operates through the International Child 
Abduction Remedies Act (“ICARA”) in the United States, for help 
in restoring his visits with his children.  Unfortunately, his 
efforts proved unsuccessful.  This Note explores why.1 
† J.D., 2015, St. John’s University School of Law. 
1 Most left behind parents are fathers, not mothers. In 2008, the latest year for 
which statistics of international parental abductions are available, fifty-nine percent 
of parents taking children to the United States were mothers, and mothers 
constituted sixty-nine percent of taking parents worldwide. Hague Conference on 
Private International Law, A Statistical Analysis of Applications Made in 2008 
Under the Hague Convention of 25 October 1980 on the Civil Aspects of International 
Child Abduction, Part III—National Reports, 6, (May 2011) available at 
http://www.hcch.net/upload/wop/abduct2011pd08c.pdf. These percentages were 
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The Hague Convention “protect[s] children internationally 
from the harmful effects of their wrongful removal or retention 
and . . . establish[es] procedures to ensure their prompt return to 
the State of their habitual residence, as well as to secure 
protection for rights of access.”2  It was ratified in the United 
States on April 29, 1988, and on that day, President Reagan also 
signed ICARA into law.3 
Both the Hague Convention and ICARA are meant to 
provide a method for seeking the return of a child or enforcing 
visitation rights for a child who has been abducted 
internationally by a parent or guardian.  However, both have 
been widely criticized as falling short when it comes to visitation 
rights.4  Unlike petitions under the more well-known aspects of 
the Hague Convention and ICARA, which provide for a child’s 
repatriation to the country of last habitual residence, visitation 
petitions do not fare well in the United States.  Federal district 
courts regularly deny visitation enforcement requests for lack of 
subject-matter jurisdiction, essentially leaving no recourse in the 
federal court system for noncustodial parents whose children are 
abducted by custodial parents and taken to the United States.5  
Further, prior to 2013, the only federal circuit court that had 
consistent with the two previous surveys conducted in 1999 and 2003. Id. 
Additionally, approximately seventy-two percent of taking parents were the child’s 
primary caretaker. Hague Conference on Private International Law, A Statistical 
Analysis of Applications Made in 2008 Under the Hague Convention of 25 October 
1980 on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, Part I—Global Report, 6, 
(May 2011), available at http://www.hcch.net/upload/wop/abduct2011pd08ae.pdf. 
2 Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, opened for 
signature Oct. 25, 1980, T.I.A.S. No. 11,670, 1343 U.N.T.S. 89 [hereinafter Hague 
Convention]. 
3 Id. The Hague Convention entered into force on December 1, 1983 was ratified 
by the United States on April 29, 1988 and was proclaimed by President Reagan on 
November 7, 1988. International Child Abduction Remedies Act, 
42 U.S.C. §§ 11601–11611 (2012) (current version at 22 U.S.C. §§ 9001–9011 (2012)). 
4 See Bromley v. Bromley, 30 F. Supp. 2d 857, 860–61 & n.5 (E.D. Pa. 1998) 
(compiling journal articles that have criticized the failure to provide a remedy 
concerning visitation rights for parents); Priscilla Steward, Access Rights: A 
Necessary Corollary to Custody Rights Under the Hague Convention on the Civil 
Aspects of International Child Abduction, 21 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 308, 331 (1997) 
(“Although Article 21 [of The Hague Convention] recognizes rights of [visitation], the 
Convention has no provisions that enforces [sic] such rights. Experts say that one of 
the Convention’s biggest failures is its ineffectiveness at securing rights of 
[visitation].” (footnote omitted)). 
5 See, e.g., Wiezel v. Wiezel-Tyrnauer, 388 F. Supp. 2d 206, 212 (S.D.N.Y. 2005); 
Wiggill v. Janicki, 262 F. Supp. 2d 687, 690 (S.D. W. Va. 2003); Bromley, 30 F. Supp. 
2d at 862. 
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considered a claim for enforcement of visitation rights was the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in Cantor 
v. Cohen.6  The Fourth Circuit held, just as several district courts 
had, that it lacked jurisdiction to hear a claim for the 
enforcement of visitation rights under ICARA.7  However, in 
February 2013, the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit also had the opportunity to hear this issue in 
Ozaltin v. Ozaltin,8 and it came to the opposite conclusion.  In 
Ozaltin, the Second Circuit held that ICARA does create a 
federal right of action for the enforcement of visitation rights, 
thereby declaring that federal courts do have subject-matter 
jurisdiction over such claims.9 
This Note argues that the Second Circuit’s approach is more 
consistent with the aims of the Hague Convention and the needs 
of children than the Fourth Circuit’s approach and that ICARA 
does confer jurisdiction upon federal courts to adjudicate claims 
for the enforcement of visitation rights under the Hague 
Convention.  Part I discusses the background of the Hague 
Convention and ICARA and how visitation rights fit into each.  
Part II discusses the split between the Fourth Circuit and the 
Second Circuit regarding whether ICARA confers jurisdiction 
upon federal courts over claims for the enforcement of visitation 
rights.  It further examines the issue by analyzing the holdings of 
a number of district courts that have held that they lacked 
subject-matter jurisdiction to consider claims for enforcement of 
visitation rights under ICARA.  Part III argues that the Second 
Circuit was correct in holding that ICARA creates a federal right 
of action for the enforcement of visitation rights and that federal 
courts do in fact have subject-matter jurisdiction to hear such 
claims.  Part IV suggests an amendment to the Hague 
Convention that would prevent future decisions in which federal 
courts dismiss visitation claims under ICARA for lack of 
jurisdiction. 
6 442 F.3d 196 (4th Cir. 2006). 
7 Id. at 197. 
8 708 F.3d 355 (2d Cir. 2013). 
9 Id. at 371. 
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I. BACKGROUND OF THE HAGUE CONVENTION AND ICARA 
A. The Hague Convention 
The Hague Conference on Private International Law 
(“Conference”) is an intergovernmental organization comprised of 
seventy-seven members—seventy-six nations and the European 
Union.10  The Conference was created in 1893 and earned 
permanency as an intergovernmental organization in 1955 
through the enactment of its statute, which declared it a 
permanent character in the international community.11  Since its 
inception, the Conference has met every four years to negotiate 
and adopt conventions and to discuss future work.12  One such 
convention, concluded on October 25, 1980, was the Hague 
Convention.13 
The Hague Convention addressed concerns with the growing 
incidence of international parental child abduction fueled by the 
ease of international travel, the increasing number of bicultural 
marriages, and the rising divorce rate.14  This concern was due to 
the potentially serious consequences for children as well as the 
parents who have been left behind when an international child 
abduction occurs.15  Not only is the child removed from contact 
with the parent who has been left behind, but the child is also 
10 Overview, HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE INT’L LAW, http://www.hcch.net/ 
index_en.php?act=text.display&tid=26 (last visited Mar. 28, 2015). 
11 Id. 
12 Id. Along with the seventy-seven members, nonmember States have 
increasingly become parties to Hague Conventions, resulting in more than 140 
countries around the world being involved with the Hague Conference. Id. 
13 Hague Convention, supra note 2. The Hague Convention presently has ninety 
“Contracting States,” sixty-four of which are members of the Conference and twenty-
six of which are not members of the Conference. Hague Conference on Private 
International Law, Status Table, http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=con 
ventions.status&cid=24 (last visited Mar. 28, 2015) [hereinafter Status Table]. 
Contracting States are signatory states that have ratified the Hague Convention. 
See Scott M. Smith, Annotation, Construction and Application of International Child 
Abduction Remedies Act (42 U.S.C.A. §§ 11601 et seq.), 125 A.L.R. FED. 217 § 2 
(1995). 
14 Outline: Hague Child Abduction Convention, HAGUE CONFERENCE ON 
PRIVATE INT’L LAW 1 (May 2014), http://www.hcch.net/upload/outline28e.pdf. Many 
such abductors are custodial mothers who wish to return to their home country after 
their marriage to a foreign citizen caused them to live abroad. See Linda Silberman, 
Patching up the Abduction Convention: A Call for a New International Protocol and 
a Suggestion for Amendments to ICARA, 38 TEX. INT’L L.J. 41, 45 (2003). 
15 Outline: Hague Child Abduction Convention, supra note 14. 
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removed from a familiar environment and relocated to an 
environment in which the social structure, culture, and even 
language may be completely different.16  These concerns are 
enunciated clearly in the enacting provision of the Hague 
Convention, which describes its purpose as “protect[ing] children 
internationally from the harmful effects of their wrongful 
removal or retention and to establish procedures to ensure their 
prompt return to the State of their habitual residence, as well as 
to secure protection for rights of access.”17 
The Hague Convention consists of forty-five articles, the 
objectives of which are “to secure the prompt return of children 
wrongfully removed to or retained in any Contracting State; 
and . . . to ensure that rights of custody and of access under the 
law of one Contracting State are effectively respected in the other 
Contracting States.”18  Article 5 explains that “ ‘rights of custody’ 
shall include rights relating to the care of the person of the child 
and, in particular, the right to determine the child’s place of 
residence,”19 while “ ‘rights of access’ shall include the right to 
take a child for a limited period of time to a place other than the 
child’s habitual residence.”20  Therefore, “rights of access” are 
essentially visitation rights for the noncustodial parent.21  The 
Hague Convention also sets forth the remedies available for 
breaches of custody rights and for breaches of visitation rights.22  
In order to address such breaches, the Hague Convention 
requires that each “Contracting State” establish a “Central 
Authority,” which has “the broad mandate of assisting applicants 
to secure the return of their children or the effective excercise 
16 Id. 
17 Hague Convention, supra note 2. 
18 Id. art. 1, 3 (“The removal or the retention of a child is considered wrongful 
where—it is in breach of rights of custody attributed to a person, an institution or 
any other body, either jointly or alone, under the law of the State in which the child 
was habitually resident immediately before the removal or retention; and . . . at the 
time of removal or retention those rights were actually exercised, either jointly or 
alone, or would have been so exercised but for the removal or retention.”). 
19 Id. art. 5. 
20 Id. 
21 See id; see also 42 U.S.C. § 11602 (2012) (current version at 22 U.S.C. § 9002 
(2012)) (“[T]he term ‘rights of access’ means visitation rights.”). While the Hague 
Convention uses the term “access rights,” this Note uses the term “visitation rights,” 
as the two terms are synonymous and “visitation rights” is the more commonly used 
term. 
22 Hague Convention, supra note 2, art. 8. 
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[sic] of their visitation rights.”23  According to the Hague 
Convention, the breach of custody rights requires the Central 
Authority to issue an order for the return of the child to the 
child’s home country.24 
The Hague Convention was signed by the United States on 
December 23, 1981, ratified by the President on April 29, 1988, 
and entered into force on July 1, 1988.25  On the same day that he 
ratified the Hague Convention, President Reagan signed 
ICARA.26 
B. The International Child Abduction Remedies Act 
The Hague Convention is, in form, a self-executing treaty, 
and therefore no implementing legislation was necessary to bring 
it into force.27  The United States nonetheless implemented it 
through ICARA in order to “fit this unique treaty smoothly into 
our legal system with its federal and state court systems, 
potential venue questions, privacy legislation, and other features 
that distinguish the United States from many other countries.”28  
In its findings section, Congress emphasized its belief that 
international child abduction and retention is harmful to 
children, that the incidence of international child abduction is on 
the rise, and that custody should not be obtained by the wrongful 
removal or retention of the child.29  Pursuant to these findings, 
ICARA provides a procedural mechanism that protects the rights 
23 Hague International Child Abduction Convention: Text and Legal Analysis, 
51 Fed. Reg. 10,494, 10,511 (Mar. 26, 1986). A “Central Authority” is the local 
agency in the receiving state which is responsible for coordinating repatriation and 
visitation requests under the Hague Convention. The Central Authority for the 
United States is the Department of State, Office of Children’s Issues. See Hague 
Conference on Private International Law, Statistical Analysis Part II: National 
Reports United States, at 1, http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=publications.det 
ails&pid=2857&dtid=32 (last visited Mar. 28, 2015). 
24 Hague Convention, supra note 2, art. 12. 
25 See Status Table, supra note 13. 
26 See Ozaltin v. Ozaltin, 708 F.3d 355, 378 n.4 (2d Cir. 2013). 
27 Id. at 359 n.5. While the Hague Convention has also been characterized as a 
non-self-executing treaty, further inquiry into this is unnecessary because ICARA, 
an implementing legislation, was enacted in the United States. See, e.g., Cantor v. 
Cohen, 442 F.3d 196, 210 (4th Cir. 2006) (Traxler, J., dissenting); Brooke L. Myers, 
Note, Treaties and Federal Question Jurisdiction: Enforcing Treaty-Based Rights in 
Federal Court, 40 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1449, 1487 (2007). 
28 Ozaltin, 708 F.3d at 359 n.5. 
29 42 U.S.C. § 11601 (2012) (current version at 22 U.S.C. § 9001 (2012)). 
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provided in the Hague Convention.30  Through ICARA, Congress 
vested original jurisdiction over actions arising under the Hague 
Convention and ICARA concurrently in state courts and federal 
district courts.31  ICARA provides:  
Any person seeking to initiate judicial proceedings under the 
Convention for the return of a child or for arrangements for 
organizing or securing the effective exercise of rights of 
[visitation] to a child may do so by commencing a civil 
action . . . in any court which has jurisdiction of such 
action . . . .32   
However, because ICARA itself does not provide any substantive 
rights,33 federal courts must refer to the Hague Convention in 
order to determine what rights are protected.  While the 
mechanisms for seeking the return of a child are clearly laid out 
in article 12 of the Hague Convention, the mechanisms for 
organizing exercise of visitation rights are not as clear.34 
C. Visitation Rights 
1. Under the Hague Convention 
Admittedly, the Hague Convention protects visitation rights 
to a lesser extent than it does custody rights, and the remedies 
available for a breach of visitation rights do not include the 
return remedy that is provided for wrongful removals and 
retentions.35  However, visitation rights are protected primarily 
in article 21, which provides that “[a]n application to make 
arrangements for organising [sic] or securing the effective 
exercise of rights of [visitation] may be presented to the Central 
Authorities of the Contracting States in the same way as an 
application for the return of a child.”36  Once the Central 
30 See Smith, supra note 13 (“ICARA . . . is merely a procedural mechanism 
allowing access to the remedies provided in the Convention.”). 
31 Id. 
32 42 U.S.C § 11603. 
33 See Smith, supra note 13. 
34 Compare Hague Convention, supra note 2, art. 12 (“Where a child has been 
wrongfully removed or retained . . . the authority concerned shall order the return of 
the child forthwith.”), with Hague Convention, supra note 2, art. 21 (“The Central 
Authorities shall take steps to remove, as far as possible, all obstacles to the exercise 
of [visitation] rights.”). 
35 Hague International Child Abduction Convention: Text and Legal Analysis, 
51 Fed. Reg. 10,494, 10,513 (Mar. 26, 1986). 
36 Hague Convention, supra note 2, art. 21. 
37692-stj_89-2-3 Sheet No. 308 Side B      04/08/2016   13:04:55
37692-stj_89-2-3 Sheet No. 308 Side B      04/08/2016   13:04:55
C M
Y K
FINAL_CLARK 3/29/2016  3:12 PM 
1004 ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 89:997   
Authority receives a visitation enforcement application, it “shall 
take steps to remove, as far as possible, all obstacles to the 
exercise of such rights.”37  Further, the Central Authority is to 
take all appropriate measures pursuant to article 7 to “promote 
the peaceful enjoyment of [visitation] rights and the fulfillment of 
any conditions to which the exercise of those rights is subject.”38  
An aggrieved parent may also apply directly to the judicial 
authorities of the Contracting State for relief under other 
applicable laws, pursuant to article 29, which provides: 
This Convention shall not preclude any person, institution or 
body who claims that there has been a breach of custody or 
[visitation] rights within the meaning of Article 3 or 21 from 
applying directly to the judicial or administrative authorities of 
a Contracting State, whether or not under the provisions of this 
Convention.39  
2. Under ICARA 
ICARA, too, addresses visitation rights.  In § 11603, ICARA 
provides that “[a]ny person seeking to initiate judicial 
proceedings under the Convention for . . . arrangements for 
organizing or securing the effective exercise of rights of 
[visitation] to a child may do so by commencing a civil action by 
37 Id. 
38 Hague International Child Abduction Convention: Text and Legal Analysis, 
51 Fed. Reg. 10,494, 10,513 (Mar. 26, 1986). Article 7 of the Hague Convention lists 
the following responsibilities of the Central Authorities: 
(a) [T]o discover the whereabouts of a child who has been wrongfully 
removed or retained; (b) to prevent further harm to the child or prejudice to 
interested parties by taking or causing to be taken provisional measures; 
(c) to secure the voluntary return of the child or to bring about an amicable 
resolution of the issues; (d) to exchange, where desirable, information 
relating to the social background of the child; (e) to provide information of a 
general character as to the law of their State in connection with the 
application of the Convention; (f) to initiate or facilitate the institution of 
judicial or administrative proceedings with a view to obtaining the return 
of the child and, in a proper case, to make arrangements for organising [sic] 
or securing the effective exercise of rights of [visitation]; (g) where the 
circumstances so require, to provide or facilitate the provision of legal aid 
and advice, including the participation of legal counsel and advisers; (h) to 
provide such administrative arrangements as may be necessary and 
appropriate to secure the safe return of the child; (i) to keep each other 
informed with respect to the operation of this Convention and, as far as 
possible, to eliminate any obstacles to its application. 
Hague Convention, supra note 2, art. 7. 
39 Hague Convention, supra note 2, art. 29. 
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filing a petition . . . in any court which has jurisdiction of such 
action.”40  The same section goes on to provide the relevant 
burden of proof in cases pertaining to visitation  
rights—petitioners must establish by a preponderance of the 
evidence that they have such rights.41  ICARA does not create 
new substantive rights and the federal courts do not have the 
power to grant visitation rights to noncustodial parents where 
none previously existed.  However, ICARA undoubtedly 
empowers federal courts to enforce visitation rights that 
noncustodial parents have already established in their country of 
residence.  For this reason, as discussed more fully below, this 
Note asserts that ICARA provides federal courts with a 
mechanism for remedying breaches of visitation rights by 
conferring upon these courts the jurisdiction to do so. 
II. FEDERAL COURT SPLIT 
This Part discusses the split of authority between the Fourth 
Circuit, which held that ICARA does not confer jurisdiction upon 
federal courts to adjudicate claims for enforcement of visitation,42 
and the Second Circuit, which held that ICARA does create a 
federal right of action to secure the effective exercise of visitation 
rights protected under the Hague Convention.43  Beyond the 
Fourth Circuit holding alone, a number of district courts and 
commentators have also found that ICARA does not bestow upon 
federal courts subject-matter jurisdiction to consider claims 
regarding visitation rights. 
40 42 U.S.C. § 11603 (2012) (current version at 22 U.S.C. § 9003 (2012)). 
41 Id. 
42 Cantor v. Cohen, 442 F.3d 196, 197 (4th Cir. 2006). 
43 Ozaltin v. Ozaltin, 708 F.3d 355, 371 (2d Cir. 2013). The Second Circuit stated 
that, “[p]roperly framed, the Mother’s argument is not jurisdictional in nature but 
instead goes to whether § 11603(b) creates a federal right of action.” Id. at 371. 
Although it stated that the issue of whether a federal statute creates a claim for 
relief is not jurisdictional in nature, it went on to assert that “subject-matter 
jurisdiction is also supplied by 42 U.S.C. § 11603(a).” Id. at 371 n.23. Consistent 
with this assertion, the remainder of this Note refers to the claim for enforcement of 
visitation rights as a jurisdictional issue. Additionally, every other federal court that 
has adjudicated a case involving this specific issue has treated this as a 
jurisdictional issue. See cases cited supra notes 5–6 (providing additional support for 
discussing the issue in this manner). 
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A. No Federal Subject-Matter Jurisdiction 
1. The Fourth Circuit’s Holding 
In Cantor v. Cohen, decided in 2006, the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that ICARA does not 
confer jurisdiction upon a federal court to hear claims for the 
enforcement of visitation rights.44  Ms. Cantor and Mr. Cohen, 
who both lived in Israel, married and had four children.45  The 
couple later divorced, and an Israeli Rabbinical Court issued a 
divorce decree providing Mr. Cohen, now living in Germany, with 
custody of two of the children and Ms. Cantor with custody of the 
other two.46  The divorce decree also granted Ms. Cantor 
visitation with the children who were in her husband’s care in 
Germany every two months and in Israel at least twice per 
year.47  After this arrangement was ordered, the parents jointly 
decided that all of the children should live with Mr. Cohen in 
Germany.48  Thereafter, Mr. Cohen moved to the United States, 
eventually residing in Silver Spring, Maryland, with all four 
children.49  During this time, Ms. Cantor continued to live in 
Israel.50 
Ms. Cantor filed a petition in the United States District 
Court for the District of Maryland on October 22, 2004, seeking 
the return of the children for whom she had custody orders and 
also seeking enforcement of her right of visitation with the other 
two children.51  The district court denied the repatriation petition 
and found that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to hear Ms. 
Cantor’s visitation claims under ICARA, therefore dismissing the 
claim.52  The court based its ruling on the lack of an affirmative 
right to initiate judicial proceedings for visitation claims under 
the Hague Convention.53  Ms. Cantor appealed to the Fourth  
 
44 Cantor, 442 F.3d at 197. 
45 Id. 
46 Id. at 197–98. The court had issued two prior divorce decrees, both of which 
also dealt with the custody and visitation of the four children. Id. at 197. 
47 Id. at 198. 
48 Id. 
49 Id. 
50 Id. 
51 Id. 
52 Id. 
53 Id. at 200. 
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Circuit, arguing that the plain language of § 11603(b) of ICARA 
confers jurisdiction upon federal courts to hear claims seeking to 
enforce visitation rights.54 
In refuting Ms. Cantor’s argument that ICARA confers 
federal courts with jurisdiction over such claims, the Fourth 
Circuit looked first to the implementing language in § 11601 of 
ICARA, finding that “particular emphasis is drawn to 
Congressional concern regarding international abduction or 
wrongful retention of children.”55  The court found it instructive 
that the section does not mention visitation rights until the last 
subsection, “and then only mentions these rights in the context of 
the Convention.”56  Further, it emphasized Congress’s 
declarations, which state that “[t]he Convention and this chapter 
empower courts in the United States to determine only rights 
under the Convention and not the merits of any underlying child 
custody claims.”57 
Based upon this finding, the Fourth Circuit turned to the 
Hague Convention itself and considered the language of article 
21, which discusses visitation.58  Article 21 states that “[a]n 
application to make arrangements for organising [sic] or securing 
the effective exercise of rights of [visitation] may be presented to 
the Central Authorities of the Contracting States in the same 
way as an application for the return of a child.”59  The Fourth 
Circuit emphasized that article 21 of the Hague Convention does 
not provide for the presentation of a visitation claim to a judicial 
authority, in “sharp contrast” to article 12, which addresses 
wrongful removal or return claims and specifically refers to the 
initiation of judicial proceedings.60 
The Fourth Circuit therefore found that § 11603 of ICARA 
must be read in conjunction with the Hague Convention.61  In 
doing so, it declared that “under the Convention” there is “no 
54 Id. at 199. 
55 Id. 
56 Id. The section referred to, § 11601(a)(4) of ICARA, explains that “[t]he 
Convention . . . establishes legal rights and procedures for the prompt return of the 
children who have been wrongfully removed or retained, as well as for securing the 
exercise of visitation rights.” Id. (alterations in original) (emphasis omitted). 
57 Id. (alteration in original). 
58 Id. at 199–200. 
59 Hague Convention, supra note 2, art. 21. 
60 Cantor, 442 F.3d at 200. 
61 Id. 
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right to initiate judicial proceedings for [visitation] claims,” and 
that “federal courts are not authorized to exercise jurisdiction 
over . . . claims” seeking to enforce those visitation claims.62  It 
found further support for its conclusion in the “long established 
precedent that federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction 
and generally abstain from hearing child custody matters.”63  
With the exception of international child abduction and wrongful 
removal claims, the court held that other child custody matters 
are better handled by the state courts.64 
The Fourth Circuit also examined the legislative history of 
ICARA, specifically looking to procedures to implement the 
Hague Convention.65  The court emphasized the discussion 
surrounding concurrent original jurisdiction and highlighted a 
comment made by Senator Alan J. Dixon of Illinois, in which he 
stated that “none of the proponents of this bill, or my 
amendment, want to see the Federal courts to be involved in 
deciding the underlying custody disputes.”66 
Finally, the Fourth Circuit offered one other common sense 
reason for its holding:  While § 11603(e)(2) of ICARA and articles 
12, 13, and 20 of the Hague Convention set forth several 
affirmative defenses that may be considered for a wrongful 
removal claim, there are no such provisions in either ICARA or 
the Hague Convention for visitation enforcement claims.67  The 
court thus found it “difficult to believe that federal courts could 
entertain [visitation] claims, yet would be left powerless to 
consider any defenses which concern the safety or the best 
interests of a child.”68 
Therefore, after taking all of these factors into account, the 
Fourth Circuit held that ICARA does not confer jurisdiction upon 
federal courts to hear claims for enforcement of visitation  
 
 
 
62 Id. 
63 Id. at 202. 
64 Id. 
65 Id. 
66 Id. (quoting 134 CONG. REC. 6484 (1988) (statement of Sen. Alan J. Dixon)) 
(emphasis omitted). 
67 Id. at 204. 
68 Id. 
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rights.69  Based upon this holding, the Fourth Circuit affirmed 
the district court’s opinion and dismissed Ms. Cantor’s claim 
seeking enforcement of her visitation rights.70 
2. The District Courts and Commentators 
Numerous district courts have also held that they lacked 
jurisdiction to hear claims under ICARA for noncustodial parents 
seeking to secure the enforcement of visitation rights.71  These 
district court decisions invariably focused on interpreting the 
Hague Convention itself, and not ICARA, in deciding whether 
they had jurisdiction to hear these cases, despite the fact that in 
each case the petitioner asserted his claim under both the Hague 
Convention and ICARA.72  The district court decisions have been 
uniform in their reasoning that article 21 of the Hague 
Convention, which addresses visitation rights, does not provide a 
judicial remedy for breaches of such rights, while article 12, 
which addresses custody rights, does provide judicial remedies 
for parents seeking the return of a child.73  This difference, the 
courts hold, means that the Hague Convention was not intended 
to empower judicial authorities to enforce visitation claims.74 
In Bromley v. Bromley,75 a noncustodial father with a 
visitation order brought an action pursuant to the Hague 
Convention and ICARA seeking the enforcement of his visitation 
rights after the mother allegedly denied him his court-ordered 
visitation with the children.76  The United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania dismissed his claim, 
holding that it lacked jurisdiction over a claim for the 
69 See supra pp. 1007–08. 
70 Cantor, 442 F.3d at 206. The Fourth Circuit was not unanimous in its 
decision however, as Judge Traxler wrote a dissenting opinion. Id. at 206–13 
(Traxler, J., dissenting). Judge Traxler would have held that the district court did in 
fact have jurisdiction to consider the visitation claim, arguing that a straightforward 
reading of ICARA suggests that it “affords aggrieved parents a judicial forum for 
resolving claims that involve either custody rights or [visitation] rights.” Id. at 208. 
Judge Traxler’s dissent went on to articulate essentially the same arguments as the 
Second Circuit later set forth in Ozaltin v. Ozaltin, 708 F.3d 355 (2d Cir. 2013). See 
discussion infra Part II.B. 
71 See cases cited supra note 5. 
72 See, e.g., Bromley v. Bromley, 30 F. Supp. 2d 857, 860 (E.D. Pa. 1998). 
73 See infra pp. 1010–11. 
74 Id. 
75 30 F. Supp. 2d 857. 
76 Id. at 858–59. 
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enforcement of his visitation rights.77  The district court 
compared article 12 of the Hague Convention, which “clearly 
provides authority for judicial authorities to order the return of a 
child ‘wrongfully’ removed,” with article 21, which is silent as to a 
remedy for visitation rights.78  Based on this lack of judicial 
remedy, the district court held that it lacked subject-matter 
jurisdiction to hear the claim.79 
Similarly, the father in In re Adams ex rel. Naik v. Naik80 
sought enforcement of his visitation rights.81  Like the petitioner 
in Bromley, he brought his case under the Hague Convention and 
ICARA after his child’s mother brought his child to the United 
States without his knowledge.82  The United States District 
Court for the Northern District of Illinois dismissed the father’s 
petition based upon the difference in wording between article 12 
of the Hague Convention, which explicitly confers jurisdiction 
upon judicial authorities to effectuate the return of a child, and 
article 21 of the Hague Convention, which does not grant any 
such rights.83 
Wiggil v. Janicki84 was decided in the same fashion.85  In this 
case, the father had custody of the child and the mother had 
summertime visitation rights.86  The mother petitioned the court, 
under the Hague Convention and ICARA, to order the father to 
pay for the child’s passport in order to facilitate the exercise of 
her visitation rights.87  In keeping with the decisions of other 
district courts, the United States District Court for the Southern 
District of West Virginia held that federal courts lack jurisdiction 
to enforce visitation rights under the Hague Convention and 
dismissed the petition.88 
The few commentators who have written about the lack of 
remedies for breaches of visitation rights have similarly looked to 
the Hague Convention, rather than to ICARA, in determining 
77 Id. at 858. 
78 Id. at 860. 
79 Id. 
80 363 F. Supp. 2d 1025 (N.D. Ill. 2005). 
81 Id. at 1026–27. 
82 Id. 
83 Id. at 1030. 
84 262 F. Supp. 2d 687 (S.D. W. Va. 2003). 
85 Id. at 688–90. 
86 Id. at 687. 
87 Id. at 688. 
88 Id. at 689. 
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that federal district courts have no subject-matter jurisdiction to 
hear claims regarding a breach of these rights.89  These 
commentators have focused on the weakness of article 21 of the 
Hague Convention, emphasizing that while it recognizes parents’ 
visitation rights, it provides no procedures for enforcing such 
rights.90  In doing so, these commentators have stressed the need 
for amendments to the Hague Convention and ICARA to provide 
for visitation enforcement.  However, like the courts, these 
commentators have overlooked ICARA’s independent  
authority—apart from the Hague Convention’s provisions—to 
enforce visitation rights.  It is this authority, provided solely by 
ICARA, on which the Second Circuit relied in enforcing visitation 
rights under the Hague Convention. 
B. Recognizing Federal Jurisdiction 
On February 11, 2013, the Second Circuit became the first 
U.S. circuit court to hold that federal courts do have jurisdiction 
to consider a claim for visitation under ICARA with its ruling in 
Ozaltin v. Ozaltin.91  Nurettin Ozaltin (“father”) and Zeynep 
Ozaltin (“mother”), each of whom was a dual citizen of Turkey 
and the United States, were married and had two daughters 
together.92  The children resided primarily in Turkey with both 
parents until the mother took the children to New York following 
a fight with the father.93 
Approximately two weeks later, the father filed an 
application with the Turkish Ministry of Justice, in accordance 
with the Hague Convention, seeking an order that the mother 
89 See infra note 87. 
90 See Steward, supra note 4, at 330–31 (“The Hague Abduction Convention 
attempts to protect and facilitate the [visitation] rights of non-custodial parents in 
Articles 7 and 21. . . . Although Article 21 recognizes rights of [visitation], the 
Convention has no provisions that enforces [sic] such rights.”); see also Daniel M. 
Fraidstern, Croll v. Croll and the Unfortunate Irony of the Hague Convention on the 
Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction: Parents with “Rights of Access” Get 
No Rights To Access Courts, 30 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 641, 662–63 (2005) 
(“Unfortunately, however, the remedies presented to a noncustodial parent [by the 
Hague Convention] are insufficient; they do not adequately serve the interests of 
justice, they may not be in the best interests of the child, and they do not serve the 
purpose of the treaty.” (footnote omitted)); Silberman, supra note 14, at 48 (“The 
Convention’s mechanisms for enforcement of [visitation] rights, which were always 
less than robust, have been further limited by various court interpretations.”). 
91 708 F.3d 355, 357–58 (2d Cir. 2013). 
92 Id. at 360. 
93 Id. 
37692-stj_89-2-3 Sheet No. 312 Side B      04/08/2016   13:04:55
37692-stj_89-2-3 Sheet No. 312 Side B      04/08/2016   13:04:55
C M
Y K
FINAL_CLARK 3/29/2016  3:12 PM 
1012 ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 89:997   
return the children to Turkey.94  At that time, the mother 
initiated divorce proceedings in Turkey and the Turkish court 
granted the father alternate weekend visits in the United 
States.95  The father exercised this right several times between 
May and August of 2011.96  However, eventually the mother 
began attempting to limit his access by imposing conditions and 
other restrictions that the Turkish court had not.97 
The father filed an action in the United States District Court 
for the Southern District of New York pursuant to 
42 U.S.C. § 11603(b), seeking “(1) an order enforcing his 
visitation rights, pursuant to Article 21 of the Hague Convention; 
[and] (2) an order requiring the [m]other to return the children to 
Turkey, pursuant to Article 12 of the Hague Convention.”98  
Shortly thereafter, the district court issued an order requiring 
the mother to allow the father his visitation rights granted by the 
Turkish court “as long as [the children] stayed in the United 
States with their mother” and ordering the mother to show cause 
as to why the petition should not be granted in full.99  After a two 
month trial, the district court issued an order requiring the 
mother to “(1) comply with the Turkish court’s visitation order, 
[and] (2) return the children to Turkey by July 15, 2012.”100 
The mother did return the children to Turkey but continued 
to contest the district court’s order, including the order upholding 
the father’s visitation rights that had been granted in Turkey.101  
She appealed to the Second Circuit, arguing that federal courts 
lack subject-matter jurisdiction over claims seeking to enforce 
visitation rights.102  She further argued that the only method to 
seek the enforcement of visitation rights is in a state court, or 
through the Department of State, acting in its role as the 
“Central Authority” for the United States under the Hague 
94 Id. 
95 Id. at 361. 
96 Id. 
97 Id. at 362. 
98 Id. (footnote omitted). 
99 Id. at 357, 363. 
100 Id. at 364. 
101 Id. at 365. 
102 Id. The mother also appealed the order requiring her to return the children 
to Turkey, arguing, unsuccessfully, that she removed the children from Turkey with 
the consent of the Turkish court. Id. The remainder of the discussion of this case 
does not address the return order issue, but rather focuses on the visitation issue. 
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Convention.103  The Second Circuit disagreed with the mother’s 
argument, holding that ICARA does in fact create a federal right 
of action to enforce visitation rights and thereby asserting 
jurisdiction over the father’s claim.104 
The Second Circuit based its determination primarily on a 
plain reading of the statute.  In a sharp departure from the line 
of cases discussed in Section A, the Second Circuit held that 
“[t]he statutory basis for a federal right of action to enforce 
[visitation] rights under the Hague Convention could hardly be 
clearer.”105  The Second Circuit first looked to the enacting 
legislation, which states that “[t]he courts of the States and the 
United States district courts shall have concurrent original 
jurisdiction of actions arising under the [Hague] Convention.”106  
The enacting legislation continues: 
Any person seeking to initiate judicial proceedings under the 
Convention for the return of a child or for arrangements for 
organizing or securing the effective exercise of rights of 
[visitation] to a child may do so by commencing a civil action by 
filing a petition for the relief sought in any court which has 
jurisdiction of such action and which is authorized to exercise 
its jurisdiction in the place where the child is located at the time 
the petition is filed.107 
Further, the statute even provides for the burden of proof 
necessary in cases regarding visitation in § 11603(e)(1)(B):  “A 
petitioner in an action brought under subsection (b) of this 
section shall establish by a preponderance of the evidence . . . in 
the case of an action for arrangements for organizing or securing 
the effective exercise of rights of [visitation], that the petitioner 
has such rights.”108  The Second Circuit read these sections of the 
statute together and concluded that ICARA “unambiguously 
creates a federal right of action to secure the effective exercise of 
[visitation] rights” protected under the Hague Convention.109 
 
103 Id. at 371. 
104 Id. 
105 Id. at 372. 
106 Id. (alterations in original) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 11603 (2012) (current 
version at 22 U.S.C. § 9003 (2012))). 
107 Id. (alteration in original) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 11603). 
108 Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 11603). 
109 Id. 
37692-stj_89-2-3 Sheet No. 313 Side B      04/08/2016   13:04:55
37692-stj_89-2-3 Sheet No. 313 Side B      04/08/2016   13:04:55
C M
Y K
FINAL_CLARK 3/29/2016  3:12 PM 
1014 ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 89:997   
The Second Circuit found further support for its conclusion 
that the courts must assume jurisdiction in the fact that the 
Central Authority “apparent[ly] lack[s] . . . any administrative 
apparatus for enforcing [visitation] rights.”110  The Hague 
Convention provides: 
[A] Central Authority . . . must offer facilitative services to the 
petitioner, such as taking appropriate measures to “discover the 
whereabouts of [the] child,” “bring about an amicable resolution 
of the issues,” and, as particularly relevant here, “initiate or 
facilitate the institution of judicial or administrative 
proceedings with a view to obtaining the return of the 
child . . . .”111 
The Second Circuit concluded that this “facilitative” role does not 
displace or inhibit the ability of a party to make a claim directly 
to a federal court under ICARA.112 
Therefore, considering the statutory interpretation of ICARA 
along with the lack of administrative remedies available through 
the Hague Convention and ICARA, the Second Circuit held that 
federal law in the United States provides an avenue for 
noncustodial parents to seek judicial relief in a federal district 
court for the effective exercise of visitation rights.113  For this 
reason, the district court’s ruling with respect to the visitation 
issue was affirmed.114 
III. ICARA DOES GIVE FEDERAL COURTS JURISDICTION TO 
ENFORCE VISITATION RIGHTS 
A. Plain Meaning of ICARA 
The Second Circuit’s approach in Ozaltin, which granted 
federal courts jurisdiction to consider such claims, is the better 
approach, as it promotes greater protection for the child and thus 
advances the purpose of the statute.115  A plain reading of ICARA 
seems to confer jurisdiction upon federal courts to hear claims 
regarding visitation.  Section 11603 of ICARA, which articulates 
judicial remedies, states that “[t]he courts of the States and the 
110 Id. at 373. 
111 Id. (alteration in original). 
112 Id. at 374. 
113 Id. 
114 Id. at 371. 
115 Id. at 374. 
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United States district courts shall have concurrent original 
jurisdiction of actions arising under the Convention” and that 
“[a]ny person seeking to initiate judicial proceedings under the 
Convention for . . . arrangements for organizing or securing the 
effective exercise of rights of [visitation] to a child may do so by 
commencing a civil action . . . in any court which has 
jurisdiction.”116  The Second Circuit held that this language 
“unambiguously” gave district courts original jurisdiction along 
with the courts of the States.117 
The Fourth Circuit nonetheless precluded federal court 
jurisdiction on the ground that under the Convention, there are 
no rights to initiate judicial proceedings for claims regarding 
visitation.118  However, there is no requirement that ICARA be 
read so restrictively.  Section 11601(a) of ICARA, which sets forth 
the findings of Congress, notes that the Hague Convention 
“establishes legal rights and procedures for . . . securing the 
exercise of visitation rights.”119  It is clear that Congress intended 
that actions to secure visitation rights arising under the Hague 
Convention be adjudicated in federal courts.120 
Further, the Hague Convention itself has an objective to 
“ensure that rights of custody and of [visitation] under the law of 
one Contracting State are effectively respected in the other 
Contracting States.”121  Therefore, the Hague Convention 
recognizes visitation rights and seeks to protect such rights.  
Finally, while the Fourth Circuit held that the Hague Convention 
itself does not explicitly articulate rights to initiate judicial 
proceedings for claims regarding visitation, the court failed to 
recognize that the Hague Convention does advise that where a 
Contracting State provides a judicial forum, a noncustodial 
parent seeking to enforce visitation rights may initiate judicial 
proceedings directly.122 
116 42 U.S.C. § 11603(a)–(b) (2012) (current version at 22 U.S.C. § 9003 (2012)). 
117 Ozaltin, 708 F.3d at 372. 
118 Cantor v. Cohen, 442 F.3d 196, 200 (4th Cir. 2006). 
119 42 U.S.C. § 11601(a)(4). 
120 See id. 
121 Hague Convention, supra note 2, art. 1. 
122 Id. art. 29 (“This Convention shall not preclude any person, institution or 
body who claims that there has been a breach of custody or [visitation] rights within 
the meaning of Article 3 or 21 from applying directly to the judicial or 
administrative authorities of a Contracting State . . . .”). 
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B. Legislative History of ICARA 
Beyond the plain reading of ICARA, the relevant legislative 
history makes it clear that federal courts were intended to have 
subject-matter jurisdiction over enforcement of claims for 
visitation.  In March of 1986, the Department of State made 
available the Letters of Transmittal and Submittal, English text 
of the Convention, and legal analysis concerning the enactment 
of ICARA.123  In the legal analysis section, the Department of 
State stated: 
In addition to or in lieu of invoking Article 21 to resolve 
visitation-related problems, under Articles 18, 29 and 34 an 
aggrieved parent whose [visitation] rights have been violated 
may bypass the [Central Authority] and the Convention and 
apply directly to the judicial authorities of a Contracting State 
for relief under other applicable laws.124 
The Letter of Transmittal clarifies the function of articles 18, 
19, and 34 of the Hague Convention, which is to allow a 
petitioner to apply directly to the judicial authorities rather than 
attempting to enforce visitation rights through the Central 
Authorities of a Contracting State.125  Accordingly, this analysis 
provides further support for the argument that a person seeking 
to enforce visitation rights may apply directly to the federal 
courts under ICARA.126 
Interestingly, the Fourth Circuit also purports to rely on 
legislative history in support of its contention that federal courts 
may not hear visitation claims, citing statements made by 
Senator Alan J. Dixon during the procedures to implement 
ICARA, in which he states, “[T]he [C]onvention and this act 
empower courts in the United States to determine only rights 
under the convention and not the merits of any underlying child 
custody claims.”127  In quoting this passage, the court seems to 
suggest that preexisting visitation rights are not “rights under 
123 See Hague International Child Abduction Convention: Text and Legal 
Analysis, 51 Fed. Reg. 10,494 (Mar. 26, 1986). 
124 Id. at 10,514. 
125 Id. 
126 While this legislative history, along with the text of ICARA, allows a 
petitioner seeking enforcement of visitation rights to apply directly to state or 
federal courts, for policy reasons discussed more fully infra, federal district courts 
are the more appropriate avenue to obtain relief. See infra Part III.D. 
127 Cantor v. Cohen, 442 F.3d 196, 202 (4th Cir. 2006) (quoting 134 CONG. REC. 
6484 (1988) (statement of Sen. Alan J. Dixon)) (emphasis omitted). 
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the convention” but “underlying child custody claims.”128  The 
basis for this analysis, however, is not clear, as enforcing a 
preexisting right does not involve determining whether that right 
should be restricted in a particular case.  The Hague Convention 
merely directs Contracting States to maintain the status  
quo—including the visitation status quo—until either the child is 
returned to the originating state or the petition under the Hague 
Convention is denied.129  That is, when the noncustodial parent is 
seeking the enforcement of visitation rights under ICARA, the 
visitation has already been granted by a court of the other 
Contracting State.  Therefore, the federal court need not consider 
the merits of the underlying custody claim but only enforce the 
rights that have already been granted, until the merits can be 
decided by a court empowered to do so. 
C. Common Sense Approach 
Contrary to the Fourth Circuit’s rationale, the Second 
Circuit’s common sense approach to the interpretation of ICARA 
indicates that it does vest jurisdiction in federal courts to hear 
claims regarding visitation rights.  The Central Authorities are 
only able to offer “facilitative services” for a parent seeking the 
enforcement of visitation rights.130  Further, § 11603(e)(1)(B) of 
ICARA sets forth the burden of proof a petitioner must establish 
in order to bring an action for enforcement of visitation rights.131  
It seems unlikely, and is certainly not protective of the child, to 
suggest that the drafters of ICARA would establish such 
requirements if an aggrieved parent could do no more than seek 
the “facilitative services” of the Central Authorities following a 
breach of his or her visitation rights. 
 
 
128 Id. 
129 See Hague Convention, supra note 2. 
130 42 U.S.C. § 11603 (2012) (current version at 22 U.S.C. § 9003 (2012)). 
131 Id. (“A petitioner in an action brought under subsection (b) of this section 
shall establish by a preponderance of the evidence . . . in the case of an action for 
arrangements for organizing or securing the effective exercise of rights of 
[visitation], that the petitioner has such rights.”). 
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D. Policy Argument 
International child abduction has immensely detrimental 
effects on not only the parent who has been left behind, but also, 
and most importantly, on the abducted child.132  The abducted 
child is taken from a familiar environment and abruptly isolated 
from the family and friends the child once knew.133  The child’s 
relationship with the left behind parent is almost completely 
terminated, the child is forced to live in a new environment and 
culture with which the child must quickly become accustomed, 
and the child is kept in the exclusive control of the abducting 
parent, who may use this opportunity to further alienate the 
child from the left behind parent.134  Research has indicated that 
a child who has been recovered from such abductions often may 
experience a wide range of emotional and psychological problems, 
including “anxiety, eating problems, nightmares, mood swings, 
sleep disturbances, aggressive behavior, resentment, guilt, and 
fearfulness.”135  Further, the relationship with the parent who 
has been left behind may be gravely damaged.136  After being 
reunited, the child is often distrustful of the parent and questions 
why the parent did not try harder to find the child.137 
Research shows that the removal of a child resulting in a 
breach of a parent’s visitation rights is just as damaging to the 
child as a removal resulting in the breach of custody rights.138  In 
accordance with this fact and the rationale that visitation is not 
only a right held by the noncustodial parent, but also held jointly 
by the child, a high value is placed a noncustodial parent’s rights 
to visitation.139  Therefore, when custodial parents breach that 
right, they not only violate the rights of noncustodial parents, but 
those of the child as well.  Because ICARA is meant to protect 
132 See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, REPORT ON COMPLIANCE WITH THE HAGUE 
CONVENTION ON THE CIVIL ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL CHILD ABDUCTION 42 (2007) 
[hereinafter REPORT ON COMPLIANCE], available at http://travel.state.gov/content/ 
dam/childabduction/child_abduction_Compliance_Report.pdf. 
133 Id. 
134 See Steward, supra note 4, at 318. 
135 REPORT ON COMPLIANCE, supra note 128, at 42. 
136 Id. 
137 Id. 
138 See Steward, supra note 4, at 329 & n.136 (“[D]epriving [a] child of [a] family 
environment is equally detrimental regardless of [the] type of legal title [the] parent 
possesses.”). 
139 See Fraidstern, supra note 90, at 663–64 (quoting Pecorello v. Snodgrass, 142 
A.D.2d 920, 921, 530 N.Y.S.2d 350, 351 (4th Dep’t 1988)). 
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children from the harmful effects of child abduction, it must 
provide for more than “facilitative services” to remedy breaches 
of visitation rights, which are just as harmful to children as 
breaches of custody rights.  It must also provide for enforcement 
of visitation rights, as they are rights under the Hague 
Convention and such rights are inextricably entwined with the 
well-being of the abducted child.  The most efficient method of 
enforcing such rights, and the method authorized in the text of 
ICARA itself, is through adjudication in the federal court system. 
The Fourth Circuit asserted that state courts are better 
suited to consider claims for the enforcement of visitation rights 
under ICARA because state courts have the specialized training 
and experience to deal with child custody matters.140  However, 
as has already been established, the merits of the underlying 
custody issue are not a proper subject for federal court resolution, 
so it is unclear why that would be raised as an objection to 
enforcing visitation.  When considering claims for the 
enforcement of visitation rights under ICARA, the court is not to 
examine any child custody issues.  Rather, because a court in the 
home country will have already examined those issues and made 
an order for visitation, the court must do no more with regard to 
child custody issues than enforce the preexisting order, therefore, 
federal courts are better suited to deal with such claims.  Courts 
adjudicating claims for the enforcement of visitation rights under 
ICARA are not required to consider any child custody issues but 
rather must consider issues regarding diverse citizens and the 
laws and treaties of the United States.  Thus, because 
jurisdiction is expressly granted by the text of ICARA itself, 
federal courts do have jurisdiction over such visitation 
enforcement claims. 
IV. SUGGESTIONS FOR AN AMENDMENT TO THE HAGUE 
CONVENTION 
While a careful analysis of ICARA reveals that it does confer 
jurisdiction upon federal courts to adjudicate claims regarding 
the enforcement of visitation rights,141 an amendment to the 
Hague Convention itself, clarifying the enforcement mechanism 
available, would be beneficial to avoid further decisions similar to 
140 Cantor v. Cohen, 442 F.3d 196, 202 (4th Cir. 2006). 
141 See supra Part III. 
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those of the Fourth Circuit and the district courts.  Further, such 
an amendment to the Hague Convention would ensure more 
consistent adjudication of visitation issues in all Contracting 
States.142 
An amendment to article 21 of the Hague Convention, which 
instructs the Central Authority or judicial body to enforce 
visitation rights by requiring the custodial parent to bring the 
child to the noncustodial parent in accordance with the visitation 
order, would alleviate some of the confusion presented by the 
lack of parallelism between article 12 and article 21 of the Hague 
Convention.  Further, the Fourth Circuit’s holding that a lack of 
defenses available for access claims precludes federal courts from 
hearing such claims cannot be ignored.143  Accordingly, an 
amendment allowing the defenses in article 13, which are 
available to a person opposing the return of a child,144 to also be 
available to a person opposing the enforcement of visitation 
rights would give additional guidance to federal courts.  This 
guidance would bring article 21 of the Hague Convention further 
in line with article 12 and could lessen the reluctance of federal 
courts to assert jurisdiction over these claims for which ICARA 
provides federal jurisdiction. 
CONCLUSION 
The enactment of ICARA in the United States in 1988 was 
meant to “fit [the Hague Convention] smoothly into our legal 
system.”145  Regrettably, due to the overly narrow reading used 
by many courts, ICARA has largely failed in its purpose in 
connection with visitation rights.  Fortunately for noncustodial 
parents whose children have been abducted and taken to the 
United States, the Second Circuit has interpreted ICARA in a 
more child-centered and holistic manner, recognizing federal 
jurisdiction for actions seeking the enforcement of visitation 
rights.  While the Second Circuit’s decision is a step in the right 
direction for the interpretation of ICARA, an amendment to the  
 
142 See 42 U.S.C. § 11601 (2012) (current version at 22 U.S.C. § 9001 (2012)) (“In 
enacting this chapter the Congress recognizes . . . the need for uniform international 
interpretation of the Convention.”). 
143 See Cantor, 442 F.3d at 204. 
144 See Hague Convention, supra note 2, art. 13. 
145 Ozaltin v. Ozaltin, 708 F.3d 355, 359 n.5 (2d Cir. 2013). 
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Hague Convention clarifying the remedies and defenses available 
when encountering a breach of access rights will help to prevent 
decisions in the future similar to that of the Fourth Circuit. 
 
